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A B S T R A C T
This paper contributes to the emerging literature on the adoption of environmental innovation, by investigating
the so far unexplored role of governmental demand in stimulating ‘greener’ production choices. Specifically, the
role of innovative public procurement in driving the adoption and diffusion of sustainable manufacturing
technologies is analysed. Results, based on firm-level data in the 28 Member States of the European Union,
Switzerland and the USA, are obtained through non-parametric matching techniques. Those outline the crucial
role of innovative public procurement in the uptake of environmental innovations. This confirms the relevance
of such policy instrument in allowing countries to achieve a decarbonised and sustainable growth path which is
compatible with competitiveness goals.
1. Introduction
It is difficult to identify the right amount of resources for the market
to invest in knowledge creation. This creates the space for market
(Arrow, 1962) or even broader systemic failures. The market may fail to
provide adequate levels of research and development (R & D) invest-
ments because of the limited appropriability of such activities and the
intrinsic uncertainty that characterises any innovation project. This
condition may lead to sub-optimal supply of knowledge and, as a
consequence, to overall social losses, unless properly designed policies
for science, technology and innovation are adopted. Rationales for such
policies are discussed by Laranja et al. (2008) and Flanagan et al.
(2011).
Within this framework, a broad research effort has aimed to un-
derstand the role of specific policies to stimulate innovation. Most of it
has been focused on the role of R & D subsidies to counterbalance such
under-investment and to stimulate firm's innovative activities, as well
as on R & D subsidies' negative side-effects, experienced when they
crowd out private investments ((Antonelli and Crespi, 2013; Bloom
et al., 2002; David et al., 2000; Hussinger, 2008), among others).
Only recently has there been a turn towards demand-oriented in-
novation policies, in particular on public procurement (Edler et al.,
2012; OECD, 2011), to stimulate innovation, and very few (though
robust) empirical analyses have been focused on understanding the
effects of public procurement on innovative activities as an alternative
or complementary policy instrument (Aschhoff and Sofka, 2009;
Guerzoni and Raiteri, 2015). In parallel, a new and fast-growing re-
search field has emerged about a peculiar typology of innovation, that
of environmental innovations, whose investigation requires a more
systemic lens than ‘standard’ innovations (Rennings, 2000). As these
environmental innovations are of importance for both the policy and
the business realm and have the potential to lead to win-win solutions
whereby competitiveness and environmental sustainability are com-
bined (EEA, 2014), it is relevant to investigate whether or not gov-
ernmental demand can play a role and foster their development and
diffusion.
This article bridges these two research lines and investigates, em-
pirically, whether or not public procurement is a valuable policy in-
strument to stimulate environmental innovations and, indirectly, to
contribute to decoupling economic growth and environmental pressure
in order to meet European 2020 and 2030 climate and energy targets
(EC, 2014). This is, to the author's knowledge, the first paper to explore
such a research question empirically, which is the first way in which
this article is original. The analysis of the role of procurement for sus-
tainability is not new; indeed, there are crucial contributions on the
topic such as the extensive work of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) on sustainable procurement (e.g.
(OECD, 2015)) and the United Nations Environmental Programme's
work on sustainable procurement (e.g. (UNEP, 2013)). Sustainable
procurement has been put at the centre of the international agenda, as
the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development explicitly
states the need to ‘promote public procurement practices that are
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sustainable, in accordance with national policies and priorities’ to reach
one of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (UN, 2015). The main
originality lies in the empirical testing of the presence of a statistically
relevant effect of procurement in stimulating environmental innova-
tions. The second element of originality is that generalisable results are
provided, as the empirical approach is grounded on firm-level data from
a wide range of countries: the EU-28, Switzerland and the USA. The
empirical approach accounts for the non-randomised nature of the as-
signment of public procurement tenders to applicant firms by applying
a quasi-experimental approach through non-parametric matching
techniques.
The rest of the paper is structured as it follows: Section 2 discusses
the background literature, Section 3 describes the empirical strategy,
Section 4 discusses the main results and Section 5 provides concluding
remarks and identifies future lines of research.
2. Innovative public procurement and environmental
innovations: discussion of the literature
The role of governmental demand in shaping the direction and
speed of technological change has been recognised as crucial in the
economics of innovation literature: an analysis of seven industries in
the USA (semiconductors, commercial aircraft, computers, agriculture,
pharmaceuticals, motor vehicles, residential and construction) dating
back to 1982 confirmed the pivotal role of public policies in guiding
technical progress (Nelson, 1982). Governmental support to innovative
activities through public procurement (PP) is seen as a fundamental
driver for the uptake of crucial technologies, as happened in the case of
general-purpose technologies, which were driven by defence-related
procurement in the USA (Ruttan, 2006). Those technologies – mainly
steam engines, electric motors and semiconductors – in turn played the
role of enabling technologies that fostered widespread technical pro-
gress and eventually led to economic growth (Bresnahan and
Trajtenberg, 1995). Geroski (1990) expresses a preference for PP over
subsidies to stimulate industrial innovation because of subsidies' in-
efficiencies, characterised by their being ‘unconscionably expensive’
and by the high probability that they attract ‘second-best’ projects in
which the rate of return on publicly funded R &D will be lower than
that on privately funded R & D. In contrast, Geroski observes that
government procurement has a positive net effect on R &D investments
over a broad cluster of innovations (including electronic devices, nu-
clear power, chemical products, and engines and transport equipment).
PP is recognised as a successful stimulus for innovation when certain
conditions are met: (i) when it expresses a clear and consistent set of
needs to be addressed by the innovative effort in a clear contract spe-
cification; (ii) when quality is placed at the centre of the tender, rather
than merely price; (iii) when it provides an assured market for early
products with uncertain commercial possibilities; and (iv) when it
forces contractors to share information and encourages the entry of new
competitors so that it stimulates technology diffusion (Geroski, 1990).
The author concludes that ‘there is very little question that procurement
policy can stimulate industrial innovativeness, and more than a vague
suspicion that it can be a far more potent stimulus than a policy of
generalised R &D subsidies’ (Geroski, 1990).
Only recently there has been an increasing tendency to reconsider
the role of demand-oriented policies in European innovation policies
and a discussion has emerged on the role of innovation policies to
support ‘Grand Challenges’ in terms of societal and economic goals
(Edler et al., 2012; Foray et al., 2012). Those challenges relate to the
fields of health, pharmaceuticals, energy, environment, transport and
logistics, security, and digital content (Aho et al., 2006). Among the
array of demand-side policy instruments, PP helps to reduce the risks
linked to innovation investments with unknown demand, very low
expected market size or uncertain development, all of which discourage
firms from bearing the costs of innovation (Helpman and Trajtenberg,
1994).
In line with this trend, the European Commission has chosen to set a
non-binding target of 50% of public tendering to be compliant with its
sustainability requirements by 2010, in order to favour improvements
in the environmental, energy and social performance of products and
services and the development of a Green Public Procurement initiative
(EC, 2008). This initiative outlines common criteria to be followed and
the need to increase information on the benefits and life cycle costs of
environmental friendly products. The strategy has been explicitly
linked not only to the creation of market opportunity for existing green
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) but also to a stimulus for
innovation and diversification in traditional sectors1 via the increase in
demand for green(er) products and services. In principle, the strategy
should stimulate a critical mass of demand for greener goods and ser-
vices which otherwise would be difficult to get onto the market, as
European public authorities are consumers for an amount of EUR 2
trillion per year (16% of the EU's gross domestic product (GDP)) (EC,
2008). Overall, ‘green’ PP is a (procurement) procedure that leads to
the purchase of ‘greener’ products, whose impact on the environment
throughout their whole life cycle is lower than comparable products or
solutions. This provides a stimulus for innovation and creates a
minimum critical mass for sustainable goods and services, thus helping
to overcome the problem of under-investments in innovation due to the
uncertain demand. In reality, this non-binding target has not been
reached, as mutually reinforcing obstacles are hindering those organi-
sations that should launch and promote ‘green’ tenders from doing so
(for a discussion see (Testa et al., 2016)).
The focus of the current study is not on ‘green’ PP, usually referred
to as an environmental policy tool (for a discussion see (Lundberg and
Marklund, 2011), or (Parikka-Alhola, 2008)), but rather on innovative
PP, a category that has recently received attention and is increasingly
seen as a crucial instrument for innovation policy. Regular PP occurs
when a public institution buys already existing products or services for
which no R &D is involved and supplier selection depends on readily
available information about price, quantity and performance, given the
existence of standardised markets (Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia,
2012; Uyarra and Flanagan, 2010). Innovative PP (IPP) occurs whenever
public institutions invest in products or services that have not yet been
developed but could be developed within a reasonable timeframe, and
that can help satisfy human needs or solve societal problems; thus IPP
explicitly stimulates an innovative effort (Edquist and Zabala-
Iturriagagoitia, 2012). The latter case of procurement (IPP) is the main
object of the current study. Public procurement for innovation has been
acknowledged as an important demand-side policy instrument, as it has
‘the potential to improve delivery of public policy and services, often
generating improved innovative dynamics and benefits from the asso-
ciated spillovers’, but, at the same time, ‘it has been neglected or
downplayed for many years’ (Edler and Georghiou, 2007), probably
because of the stringent competition rules adopted in Europe (Edquist
et al., 2000).
The rationale for using PP to stimulate innovation is threefold, as
discussed by Edler and Georghiou (2007): (i) IPP is a major part of local
demand and this affects decisions by multinational enterprises (MNEs)
about where to locate and the dynamics of innovation in countries; (ii)
IPP can help overcome market (information asymmetries) and system
(poor interaction) failures relating to innovative products; and (iii)
purchasing innovative solutions contributes to improving public infra-
structure and services. Intelligent and tailored intermediation services
may, however, be needed to make this instrument more effective in
connecting supply and demand (Edler and Yeow, 2016). Predicting
longer term societal needs and trends in emerging technologies can also
make this instrument more effective, as discussed in the case of an
1 Although the traditional sector might not benefit from green procurement stimulus
because it lacks systemic perspectives and skills in negotiation and inter-organisational
planning (Rizzi et al., 2014).
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Italian regional innovation policy by Vecchiato and Roveda (2014).
Overall, IPP is an important source of innovation because it counteracts
market and systemic innovation failures, which otherwise would lead to
under-investment in innovative activity (Edler and Georghiou, 2007).
Empirical analyses of the role of IPP in stimulating innovation are
surprisingly rather scarce, but they strongly confirm that it is a driver of
innovation (Aschhoff and Sofka, 2009; Guerzoni and Raiteri, 2015).
Aschhoff and Sofka (2009) focus on German firms and find that PP
leads to heterogeneous effects on firms' innovation performance: it is
particularly effective for smaller firms in geographical areas under
economic stress, thus suggesting that it may be of particular relevance
for firms facing limited resource constraints. Guerzoni and Raiteri
(2015) provide original evidence on how the interactions of demand-
and supply-side technology policies affect firms' innovative activities,
finding that the interaction of R & D subsidies, R & D tax credits and IPP
helps explain innovation, but also that IPP is more effective than R &D
subsidies in stimulating innovation.
This theoretical and empirical literature is bridged by an emerging
research field on a peculiar subset of innovations, environmental in-
novations (EI), which are characterised by special features (Rennings,
2000) and a multifaceted nature, which place their investigation at the
crossroads between environmental economics and innovation studies
(Ghisetti et al., 2015; Horbach et al., 2012; Horbach et al., 2013).
Academic contributions to this emerging research field (for a review
see (Barbieri et al., 2016)) acknowledge that environmental regulation
and standards provide valuable incentives for EI uptake and diffusion,
although some articles find statistically significant results and others do
not (Ghisetti and Pontoni, 2015). Furthermore, by analysing European
SMEs and the barriers to their innovative activities, Marin et al. (2015)
identify six clusters of heterogeneous ‘eco-innovators’ profiles; they
stress that this diversity has to be accounted for when designing en-
vironmental and innovation policies, as policies can have different ef-
fects on firms in different clusters. From a theoretical point of view,
governments can stimulate EI by exploiting multiple (even combined)
instruments: (i) environmental policy instruments, such as market-/
incentive-based instruments, command and control regulation instru-
ments, voluntary agreements or information-/education-based instru-
ments; and/or (ii) innovation policy instruments, such as enforcing/
easing the intellectual property right (IPR) protection mechanism, al-
locating tax credits for innovation, subsidising R &D activities, fa-
vouring public R & D or establishing technology transfer instruments
(Del Rìo et al., 2010).
Recently it has been argued that PP can be useful to support public
research to facilitate advances at the technological frontier and also to
meet the EU 2020 targets of socio-economic and environmental sus-
tainability. The uptake of climate-friendly technologies (namely EI)
may be influenced by public policies, since the transition to more sus-
tainable production requires the invention, adoption and diffusion of
radical and, consequently, riskier innovations, and high levels of in-
vestment, which are unlikely to be sustainable by the private sector on
its own (Mowery et al., 2010). Alternative-energy technologies are
potentially deployed to replace already existing technologies and, in-
itially, may be less reliable and/or more costly, and require public
support for their early-stage deployment. As IPP reduces the investment
risks inherent in radical innovations with uncertain markets and de-
mand, and it can create niches for the emergence of early-stage en-
vironmental technologies, it can be a valuable instrument to encourage
their early adoption and to allow their easier diffusion. Furthermore,
the more radical the innovation, the higher the entry and switching
costs; the lack of adequate policy instruments can be associated with
technological lock-in and path dependency effects favouring ‘dirtier’
established technologies (Oltra and Saint Jean, 2009). As IPP can create
niches that EI can exploit, coherently with the ‘lead market approach’
(Beise and Rennings, 2005; Edler and Georghiou, 2007; Horbach et al.,
2014), it can favour the early-stage adoption of EI to make them
widespread afterwards. Overall, there is agreement that governmental
intervention is needed to favour the adoption and diffusion of EI and
that IPP might be well positioned to be a valuable policy instrument to
this end. However, there is still no empirical confirmation that IPP ef-
fectively stimulates EI.
This paper draws on the literature described so far and it fills this
research gap by empirically testing whether or not IPP affects firms'
environmental strategies. As stated in the introduction, it is the first
empirical analysis testing the role of IPP as a policy instrument for EI.
For the reasons outlined above, the expectation, and consequently the
main research hypothesis, is that IPP positively influences firms' choices
towards the adoption of EI.
3. Data and empirical strategy
The recent Innobarometer dataset, entitled Flash Eurobarometer 415:
Innobarometer 2015 - The Innovation Trends at EU Enterprises (EC, 2015),
is exploited for the empirical strategy. The survey was carried out in
February 2015 by the consortium TNS Political and Social using a
computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) system, at the request
of the European Commission Directorate-General for Internal Market,
Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (DG GROW) and under the co-
ordination of the Directorate-General for Communication. It covers
businesses with one or more employees in the manufacturing, service
and industry sectors and the sample is stratified by size, sector and
country. Respondents were general managers, financial directors or
owners. It is a valuable source of information, as it is the only available
survey that combines, at the firm level, information on public pro-
curement with information on the adoption of environmental innova-
tions. Data on the role of IPP and the adoption of sustainable manu-
facturing technologies (or EI) are collected only for manufacturing
firms; therefore, the analysis in this paper focuses on manufacturing
firms in the EU, Switzerland and the USA and covers all businesses with
one or more employees. The full sample, representative of all sectors,
amounts to 14,118, but only 3018 of them are manufacturing firms,
thus limiting the operative sample to the latter number, which falls to
3001 after cleaning for the missing variables of interest.
The dependent variable EI takes the value 1 whether the firm has
adopted sustainable manufacturing technologies or is planning to adopt
them in the next 12 months. Those are defined in the survey as tech-
nologies which use energy and materials more efficiently and drasti-
cally reduce emissions.
The core variable of interest, IPP, exploits two questions of the
survey, the first aimed at scrutinising whether or not the firm has
participated (with or without success) in a PP tender and the second
aimed at understanding whether or not innovation was part of the
contract (see Table 2 for the full text of the questions). Unfortunately,
no information is available on how firms submit their tender proposals
and no qualitative information on the tender is provided.2 An overview
of the responses given to the first of these questions gives an interesting
and qualitative picture on the nature and magnitude of the PP phe-
nomenon. In the operative sample, 30% of respondents (915 firms)
declared that they had submitted at least one tender for a PP contract
since January 2012 (with a positive, unknown or negative outcome)
and 24% of respondents (702 firms) had won at least one PP tender.
Interestingly enough, 44% of respondents that had won at least a PP
tender declared that they had included innovations as part of the pro-
curement contract.
To construct the empirical strategy properly, the main empirical
issue to consider is that the assignment of IPP to firms may be non-
randomised: (i) firms submitting a IPP proposal may be self-selected on
certain observable characteristics; or (ii) public agencies may try to
maximise the effects of the policy by imposing selection criteria related
to firms' characteristics, as part of a strategy of ‘picking the winner’ or
2 Limitations of this point are discussed in the concluding section.
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(contrarily) ‘aiding the poor’. In other words, there is a potential se-
lection problem both on the side of firms and on the side of public
funding agencies. Estimating the effect of IPP on EI directly in such a
setting could distort the interpretation of results, since the magnitude of
the difference in environmental innovativeness depends not only on the
consequences of the technology policy.3 The non-neutral application
and funding process, thoroughly discussed by David et al. (2000),
suggests the need to rule out problems of simultaneity and selection
bias and to choose a quasi-experimental approach and non-parametric
matching method, widely applied in public funding evaluation articles
in the field of industrial economics (Almus and Czarnitzki, 2003;
Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento, 2014).
This approach considers IPP to be the treatment variable and di-
vides the total sample (3001 firms) into a treated group (308 firms) and
a control group (2693 firms), depending on whether or not firms won a
tender for a PP contract explicitly requiring innovations. As expected,
and confirmed by the statistics reported in Table 1, the two groups are
significantly different. Treated firms are more likely to be environ-
mental innovators, are older, are more innovative and have fewer
employees than control firms, as is confirmed by t-tests comparing
mean differences, whose significance is reported in the last column.
The average treatment effect on the treated firms (ATT), that is the
estimation of the effects of IPP on the outcome (EI), is equal to the
difference between the average of the target variable EI when the firm
is treated (Y1) and the average of the target variable EI when the same
firm is untreated (Y0).
Under random assignment, the independence assumption in Eq. (1)
holds, IPP is fully exogenous and the ATT effects of the treatment (IPP)
could be estimated as simple between-groups mean difference in the
outcome variable EI, as in Eq. (2).
⊥(Y ; Y ) IPP1 0 (1)
= − = = = − =
= − = =
E(Y | IPP 1) E(Y | IPP 0) E(Y | IPP 1) E(Y | IPP 0)
E(Y) E(Y ) ATT( ATE)
1 0
1 0 (2)
However, as explicitly discussed in this section, the independence
assumption does not hold in this setting, as IPP is not exogenous; rather,
it is expected to be influenced by certain observable characteristics of
firms that drive selection of who gets the treatment and who is ex-
cluded.
To properly estimate the effect of IPP as the difference in EI
outcomes depending only on it, ATT should be estimated as in Eq. (3),
and each treated firm needs to be compared with a hypothetical sce-
nario where the same firm receives no treatment, as the treated and
control groups would be different in the outcome even in the absence of
the treatment, or, formally:
= − = + = − =ATT E[Y Y | IPP 1] E[Y | IPP 1] E[Y | IPP 0]1 0 0 0 (3)
where:
= − = ≠E[Y | IPP 1] E[Y | IPP 0] 00 0 (4)
Since the counterfactual situation E[Y0|IPP = 1] is not observable,
as it is not possible to forecast a recipient firm's EI performance in the
absence of the treatment, a non-parametric approach is applied to
create comparable groups of firms. Specifically, propensity score
matching (PSM) is exploited to create the best pairs of treated and
control firms. This matching is needed to be able to compare the means
of outcomes of paired firms in EI in order to estimate ultimately the
unbiased effect of the public funding IPP. This pairing is conducted on
the basis of their propensity score values, a methodology that allows us
to summarise the multidimensionality of the matching criteria as one
single value, the propensity score, aimed at capturing the probability
that firm i accesses the treatment (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). If the
common support condition, the stable unit treatment value assumption
and the unconfoundedness, or conditional independence assumption,
hold, the average treatment effect can be estimated as the difference in
the outcome variable EI between the two paired groups of firms,
namely treated and control firms. The stable unit treatment value as-
sumption (SUTVA) assumes that the treatment of firm i does not affect
the outcome of another unit. The common support condition requires
that the vector of chosen covariates does not perfectly predict the
outcome: covariates themselves should not perfectly predict whether
firm i receives PP or not. The conditional independence assumption
requires that, once it is controlled for all observable variables, the po-
tential outcomes are independent of treatment assignment. In this fra-
mework, no unobserved factor should influence both PP and EI. Cerulli
(2015) discusses the implications and tests of these conditions. Should
all these conditions hold, PSM produces unbiased estimates of the effect
of the treatment (IPP) on the outcome (EI).
Propensity scores are computed as the probability of receiving the
treatment conditional on a set of observable characteristics that simulta-
neously influence the decision to engage in IPP and the outcome EI.
Selected observable characteristics, constructed at the firm level, are the
perception of financial constraints as a barrier to firms' innovative activity
(FIN), being part of a group (GROUP), the size of the firm in terms of full-
time equivalent employees, as a natural logarithm (Lsize), a positive in-
vestment in R&D activities (RD), whether the firm is young or not, de-
pending whether it was established after or before January 2014
Table 1
Description of the variables, statistics and t-test on mean differences.









EI The company has adopted sustainable manufacturing
technologies or plans to adopt them in the next 12 months
0 1 0.381 0.497 0.368 ⁎
FIN The company perceives a lack of financial resources 0 1 0.251 0.221 0.255 NS
GROUP The company is part of a group 0 1 0.313 0.351 0.308 NS
Lsize Natural logarithm of full-time equivalent employees 0 10.08 3.478 3.84 3.44 ⁎
IPP The company won at least one PP contract and included an
innovation as part of this contract
0 1 0.103 – – –
RD The company invests in R & D activities 0 1 0.528 0.660 0.513 ⁎
Size Firm's size measured by full-time equivalent employees 1 23,764 162.78 289.16 148.33 ⁎
YOUNG The company was established after January 2014 0 1 0.0746 0.045 0.778 ⁎
⁎ Variable mean differences between the two groups are statistically different from zero (t-test p-value < 0.05); NS, the difference between the groups is not statistically different.
3 A logit model is estimated with EI as the dependent variable and IPP, standard control
variables, and state and sector dummies as the explanatory variables, and a significant
positive effect of PP on EI is found. However, this result (estimates available upon re-
quest) is not reliable given the sources of bias described. Accordingly, this result will not
be presented.
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(YOUNG), and seven sector dummies.4 Table 2 reports the questions asked
in the survey and links them to the aforementioned variables.
Fig. 1 depicts the propensity score distribution between the groups,
before and after the matching, and shows the reduction in group
differences after the matching and its good quality.
Fig. 2 depicts the test for the overlap assumption and shows there is
no evidence of this being violated: there is no high probability mass
close to 0 or 1, and there are two estimated densities with most of their
masses in regions where they overlap.
4. Discussion of results
Once the quality of the propensity scores is confirmed, they are used for
the non-parametric matching. The choice is to ground the matching on al-
ternative algorithms to better balance the trade-off between bias and effi-
ciency (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). The three nearest neighbour
Table 2
Questions asked in the survey.
Question Variable
• (Q11A) Have you used any of the following technologies? (Y/N)
◦ Sustainable manufacturing technologies (i.e. technologies which use energy and materials more efficiently and drastically reduce emissions)
• (Q11B) Do you plan to use any of the following technologies in the next 12 months?
◦ Sustainable manufacturing technologies (i.e. technologies which use energy and materials more efficiently and drastically reduce emissions)
EI
• (Q12) Since January 2012 has your company (One possible choice):
◦ Won at least one public procurementa contract
◦ Submitted at least one tender for a public procurement contract and the outcome is unknown
◦ Submitted at least one tender for a public procurement contract without success
◦ Investigated opportunities to bid on one or more public procurement contracts, but have never submitted a tender
◦ Has never submitted a tender nor investigated opportunities to bid on a public procurement contract
• (Q13) Has your company included any of its innovations as part of any public procurement contract that you have won? (Y/N)
IPP
• (D2) When was your company established (One possible choice):
◦ Before 1 January 2009
◦ Between 1 January 2009 and 1 January 2014
◦ After 1 January 2014
YOUNG
• (D4) Is your company part of a group? (Y/N) GROUP• (Q5A–Q5B) Thinking about the commercialisation of your company's innovative goods or services since January 2012, have any of the following been a major
problem, a minor problem or not a problem at all?
◦ Lack of financial resources: a major problem
FIN






• Size of the company, sample information Lsize
Note: Additional possible answers to the original questions which are not relevant have been omitted to improve the clarity of the table.
a The read-out provided to the respondents states: ‘the term “public procurement” describes the purchase of goods, services and public works by governments and public bodies’.
Fig. 1. Propensity score distribution for treated and control
groups before and after matching.
4 The seven sector dummies included are CA, CB, CC, CD-CG, CH, CI-CL and CM
(Statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community (NACE)
Second Revision). Because of data constraints it was not possible to impose country as an
observable characteristic upon which to construct the pairing of treated and control firms,
as none of the algorithms succeeded in finding, within each and every country (30 in the
sample), pairs of firms which were similar enough in terms of the remaining observable
characteristics.
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matching (3NNM) algorithm is the selected algorithm; to provide robust-
ness, results under alternative algorithm are also reported. The 3NNM
method selects for comparison only the three observations whose propensity
scores values are closest to those of treated firm i. The alternative algorithms
presented are a single nearest neighbour matching (NNM), a 3NNM with a
caliper set to impose a minimum degree of quality on the matching, a five
nearest neighbour matching (5NNM) and a kernel matching estimator with
bootstrapped standard errors (1000 repetitions).5 All tests for matching
quality support the validity of the matching: regression t-tests on differences
in covariates means after the matching shows that all p-values are lower
than 0.05, the log-likelihood ratio is rejected before the matching and not
rejected after the matching, pseudo-R2 is lower in the matched than in the
unmatched firms and the standardised mean bias test falls below 5%.
The results of the 3NNM on NNM, 3NNM with a caliper, 5NNM and
kernel matching are reported in Table 3, column (1).
Overall, IPP is a significant driver of EI: the ATT (that is, the dif-
ference in outcome averages between the treated and control groups
after pairing) is positive and significant for the alternative matching
algorithm adopted. The number of firms that are environmentally in-
novative after being treated by IPP is 11.1 percentage points higher in
the treated group than in the control group. This result is comparable
across the alternative matching algorithms selected.
To better control for the validity of the results, an important sen-
sitivity test is conducted and reported in Table 3, column (2). The
homogeneity of firms in the two groups (treated and control) is in-
creased by excluding firms that said they had never submitted an IPP
tender or explored the possibility of doing so. The rationale for this
sensitivity test is that control and treated group might be too different
to be comparable, even after matching, when the first includes firm that
have not even tried to participate in a tender, in case those are struc-
turally different from firms that have tried (successfully or not) to win a
PP tender. This poses the risk of affecting the estimation of the effect of
IPP for treated firms. After this exclusion, the treated group remains
unaltered (308 firms) while the control group is reduced to 945 firms.
The quality of the matching is confirmed and is reported in the
Appendix A. Even with the exclusion, results, reported in column (2),
largely confirm previous findings. Firms that are environmentally in-
novative after treatment by IPP are 11.2 percentage points higher in the
treated group than in the control group.
Finally, to provide a more comprehensive picture of IPP, its effects
on more ‘standard’ innovative outcome are estimated. A variable INNO
is constructed, which is equal to 1 if firms are either product or process
innovators, and it is used as an outcome variable in the estimates of
ATT of IPP treatment. Results (column (3)) show that the effect on more
standard innovative outcomes remains significant and positive but is
half of that for EI: the number of firms in the treated group is only 6.6
percentage points higher than in the control group. In relation to EI, IPP
has twice the effect of standard innovations.
This interesting result can be explained by the introduction of specific
policy commitments towards ‘green’ PP, such as the European Green Public
Procurement Initiative (EC, 2008). Those explicit policy commitments to-
wards a green-oriented PP may have led to a transition towards greener PP
tenders and, as a consequence, to a higher increase in the environmental
Fig. 2. Overlap assumption.
Table 3
Results and robustness of alternative algorithm and alternative sampling.
Algorithm (1) (2) (3)
ATT ATT reduced sample ATT outcome INNO
3NNM 0.111⁎⁎⁎ 0.112⁎⁎⁎ 0.066⁎⁎⁎
(0.033) (0.037) (0.025)
NNM 0122⁎⁎⁎ 0.101⁎⁎⁎ 0.067⁎⁎
(0.038) (0.041) (0.028)
3NNM calipera 0.098⁎⁎⁎ 0.150⁎⁎⁎ 0.064⁎⁎
(0.034) (0.037) (0.025)
5NNM 0.107⁎⁎⁎ 0.116⁎⁎⁎ 0.060⁎⁎
(0.032) (0.036) (0.024)
Kernelb 0.121⁎⁎⁎ 0.126⁎⁎⁎ 0.077⁎⁎⁎
(0.029) (0.032) (0.024)
Note: Standard error in parentheses. Preferred algorithm in bold.
⁎ p < 0.10.
⁎⁎ p < 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
a Caliper = 0.25 times propensity scores' standard error. It equals 0.0114 in the whole
sample (columns (1) and (3)) and 0.0198 in the reduced sample (column (2)).
b Bootstrapped standard error, 1000 repetitions.
5 The teffects psmatch command in Stata14 is used to calculate ATT, since it estimates
standard errors adjusted for the first-step estimation of propensity scores, as suggested by
Abadie and Imbens (2016). The balancing property of the propensity score is tested using
the Becker and Ichino (2002) user-written Stata command pscore and is satisfied.
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innovativeness of firms than in their ‘standard’ innovativeness.6
All in all, the results largely confirm that this policy instrument has
a positive and significant effect and highlight the need to consider it to
build a policy mix to stimulate firms' environmental innovativeness
and, more broadly, the transition to a more sustainable society.
An explanation of these results, and in particular through which
mechanisms IPP affects EI, comes from the literature reviewed in
Section 2. As the full social costs of greenhouse gas emissions and
pollution in general are not (yet) reflected in market prices (Fischer and
Newell, 2008; Newell, 2010), there is room for public policies to
compensate for the risk of under-investment in environmental innova-
tions due to the absence of proper market signalling. Furthermore, the
early versions of most alternative energy technologies would be han-
dicapped in comparison with existing, dirtier technologies from the
point of view of prospective adopters, given the high risks associated
with those technologies in all stages of the innovation process, from
invention to development to commercialisation and diffusion. EI may
thus require public support, particularly for early adopters of those
technologies. Given the features of PP as an instrument that helps to
reduce the risks of innovation investments for which the demand is
unknown, the expected market size is very low or development is un-
certain, the paper argues that PP may be well placed to stimulate EI, as
they may suffer (even more than ‘standard’ innovation) from techno-
logical lock-in in favour of dirtier and more established technologies.
Before we discuss the main policy implications of these findings, the
next subsection outlines an additional robustness control that has been
performed to confirm the validity of the results.
4.1. Robustness checks on environmental regulation
As a further robustness control, the role of existing environmental
regulation in spurring the adoption of EI is accounted for. As the lit-
erature on EI largely agrees that regulatory push and pull stimulus is a
core determinant of EI (Frondel et al., 2008; Ghisetti and Pontoni, 2015;
Horbach et al., 2012; Rennings, 2000), its omission may bias the results,
if EI adoption is driven by specific environmental regulation rather than
by any IPP tender. The OECD Environmental Policy Stringency com-
posite indicator (OECD EPS) is used to extract country-level indices on
the stringency of environmental regulation. This index, ranging from 0
to 6, is selected because it allows international comparability over time
(Botta and Koźluk, 2014). It measures the stringency of environmental
regulation by putting an explicit or implicit price on polluting or en-
vironmentally harmful behaviours and it is based on the degree of
stringency of multiple environmental policy instruments, primarily re-
lated to climate and air pollution.
As this index is not available for the whole set of countries covered
in the previous sections, this analysis is considered only as a robustness
control rather than being the principal choice. The following countries
are excluded from the robustness check because of data limitations:
Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Malta, Romania and Slovenia. The final number of observations falls to
2238, of which 235 are treated and 2003 are not. The last available year
(2012) of the index is used to construct the variable EPS, which has
been included as an additional explanatory variable of EI.
The results, reported in Table 4, are consistent with previously
outlined evidence: ATT using a 3NNM is significant and equals 0.121; it
equals 0.129 when a caliper of 0.0125 is imposed.
The previous findings – although not directly comparable, given
that n changes, as do the included countries – are confirmed: the
number of firms that are environmentally innovative after treatment by
IPP is 12 percentage points higher in the treated group than in the
control group, even after controlling for environmental regulation.
5. Concluding remarks
The results previously discussed confirm the expectation that IPP
has a role in stimulating the uptake of EI, and thus, indirectly, in con-
tributing to the grand societal challenge of climate change. This evi-
dence has been proven to be robust to different robustness controls.
Procurement is increasingly seen as a way to improve sustainability.
The United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development ex-
plicitly refers to the need for countries to promote sustainable procure-
ment as one of the Sustainable Development Goals (UN, 2015). The
European Commission's Green Public Procurement initiative (EC, 2008)
sets a non-binding green public procurement target to favour im-
provements in the environmental, energy and social performance of
products and services and to stimulate their development. The present
paper has combined this view in the current article with the increasing
interest in procurement as a way to stimulate innovation, as pointed out
in the discussion of the innovation literature in Section 2.
All in all, the current empirical findings allow us to add a piece of
information that is relevant to shaping environmental as well as in-
novation policies, with important policy implications. Overall, they
support the view that IPP can play a role in improving sustainability
through the increased adoption of EI by firms. This would allow the
discussion on the role of sustainable procurement in reaching sustain-
ability targets to merge with that on the role of innovative procurement
in stimulating innovation, so that we can reach the final synthesis that
IPP is a policy tool that can positively stimulate not only (standard)
innovations but also the peculiar typology of EI. The latter are capable
of hitting environmental as well as economic sustainability targets,
possibly leading to win-win outcomes (EEA, 2014) and helping the
transition to a more sustainable society.
The results of this article go in this direction and suggest that de-
mand can affect the rate of adoption of EI and, more precisely, that IPP
strongly stimulates EI adoption. This would call for including IPP in the
array of innovation policy instruments as well as in the array of reg-
ulatory push-pull instruments for decarbonisation, to allow us to meet
the sustainability targets that have been set. The literature has indeed
already confirmed the role of EI in enhancing competitiveness (Ambec
et al., 2008; Porter and Van der Linde, 1995) and reducing environ-
mental pressure (Ghisetti and Quatraro, 2017). The diverse nature of
innovations, and EI more specifically, indicates the need to be cautious,
as a one-size-fits-all model of procurement is unlikely to work: as dis-
cussed by Uyarra and Flanagan (Uyarra and Flanagan, 2010), the in-
novative procurement model might not work in all procurement con-
texts and for all types of goods and services.
A limitation of the current study is that the data used do not shed
light on the design of the PP instrument, which instead affects how
successful this instrument is in stimulating innovation (Geroski, 1990).
PP policy measures might suffer from the presence of perceived barriers
to the suppliers (Uyarra et al., 2014) and from the lack of a systematic
basis in their design, which results in deficiencies that eventually cause
the policy to fail (Georghiou et al., 2014). A further limitation is the
Table 4
Results and robustness of alternative algorithm and alternative sampling.




3NNM caliper of 0.0125 0.129⁎⁎⁎
(0.0395)
Standard error in parentheses. Preferred algorithm in bold.
⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
6 Unfortunately the dataset allows us only to infer this interpretation, as it contains no
information on whether or not the IPP tender also included environmental requirements.
Consequently, it cannot be properly tested and it is left for future research.
C. Ghisetti Technological Forecasting & Social Change 125 (2017) 178–187
184
cross-sectional nature of the data, which does not allow the formulation
of causal connections between the variables analysed.
The current research has implications for future studies. It has
identified interesting research directions, and left them to future re-
search because of constraints and limitations on the data. Quantitative
information on the number of tenders that each firm applied for or
(even better) won is not available, and it would be of interest to test if
IPP affects EI differently depending on whether the firm has a broad
and/or deep experience in tenders or is rather immature in this field.
Secondly, it would be an interesting extension of this work to consider
the role of a policy mix that includes IPP policy tools in stimulating EI,
as Guerzoni and Raiteri (2015) do with respect to ‘standard’ innova-
tions. The last interesting extension would be to use panel data to im-
prove the conclusion about whether or not there are causal connections
between EI and IPP.
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Appendix A
Estimates of the treatment effects of IPP have been carried out on a smaller sample of firms in the control group to exclude all firms that said they
had never submitted a PP tender or explored this possibility. This would in principle increase the homogeneity of firms between the treated and
control groups to compare firms that have won a PP tender and those that have at least tried to win one. The methodology is the same described in
the article; the chosen matching algorithm is the 3NNM. Tests confirm the quality of the matching (Figs. A1 and A2).
Fig. A1. Distribution of propensity scores in reduced sample.
Fig. A2. Overlap assumption in reduced sample.
Results of the first step logistic estimation of the propensity scores used for the matchings in the article are reported in Table A1. The first column
shows those of the full sample and the second column shows those of the reduced sample.
Table A1
Robustness on alternative algorithm on subsample of firms.

















Note: Standard error in parentheses. Seven sector dummies included.
⁎ p < 0.10.
⁎⁎ p < 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
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